With maritime traffic of more than 360 million shipping containers per year, commercial ports and transportation routes are exposed targets that, in the case of an attack, could be responsible for a world economic crisis. Most ports, and especially those docking ferries or cruises, as well as marinas, are not entirely protected. An interview with Udi Dvir, Captain (RE) Israeli Navy, maritime security specialist, and International Ships and Port Facility Security (ISPS) expert.
Maritime terrorism is not limited to ship piracy and ransom demand, as it occurs on the coasts of Somalia. Nor is it limited to the use of smaller boats to reach beaches and penetrate target sites, which is what happened in Bombay this past November. Maritime terrorism poses a silent danger to the global economy, as it is capable of causing its collapse through physical damage and the tragic loss of human lives.
“The question is not if such an incident could happen”, states Udi Dvir, maritime security expert, “but rather when and where it will happen, and to what extent. Taking into account the fact that over 90% of international commerce is transported via the waters, it’s not difficult to understand that the ocean is an attractive target for whoever is interested in attacking the global economy. To impact the markets of the United States or countries of the Far East, for example, it isn’t necessary to enter their territories: attacking their commercial ports is enough to damage their economies”.
The dangers are evident, and the solutions, complicated. The current situation cannot continue as such; action must be taken, slowly but with persistence. Port authorities, shipping companies, governments and security bodies must wake up and study the penetrable structure of international waters, paying special attention to the human factor that partakes in this system.
“Who actually operates ships today? Many of the individuals who make up ship crews come from poor countries, and earn a minimum wage. Many are hired without regard to their background, their potential connection to a terrorist organization, or the possibility that they might be interested in something other than to earn a decent salary. The possibility that a terrorist could board a ship carrying millions of dollars worth of cargo, or worse yet, 80 million tons of gas, is simply horrifying”.
“The first step in improving international maritime security is identifying and defining the separate bodies that make up the whole system”, explains Dvir, “and at this point there is already great variety: Are we talking about port authorities, ministries of defense, the ship or cargo owners, or the shipping companies themselves? What is clear is that risk-reduction begins at the port, comprised of both a land and a water zone. The port authorities must activate a security system that monitors not only the people who enter and exit the port, but even the fisherman at the wharf, who up until now have been just a permanent part of the landscape. Has anyone wondered if they are simply innocent fisherman, or conversely, agents gathering information for a hostile organization?”
When discussing security systems it should be noted that not only do the officials and the beaurocracy vary from one country to another, but also the ports themselves. A Swedish port will greatly differ from a port in Sri Lanka, for example.
According to Dvir, up until about five years ago, seaport security was similar to airport security forty years ago: it sufficed to present an identification card for the gates to open and continue to the port, without a single person or vehicle having had to undergo any sort of physical check.
Since about five years ago, there has been a greater focus on access-control at port entry and exit points, but the situation is still far from satisfactory. “The protocol of many ferry ports in Greece, for example, is the same today as it was hundreds of years ago”, explains Dvir. “The residents of the small islands continue to use ferries as a means for transportation to work, to commute to and from the mainland. Their entry and exit is not monitored, which actually poses a great risk from a security perspective. Like all commercial businesses, these ports don’t want to invest money in something that doesn’t seem absolutely necessary”.
Marinas used for yachts or other recreational vessels are a similar example. In Israel, where maritime security is quite developed, no vessel can approach the shore without first being inspected by the navy or the coast guard. Nevertheless, in most countries there is no physical inspection of boats ready to dock at the country’s coast. It’s enough for the captain of the ship to communicate his arrival via radio, without undergoing any sort of identification or inspection procedures. “A terrorist group is free to smuggle in whatever it wishes, from conventional arms, to chemical, biological or radioactive weapons. It goes without saying that radioactive weapons don’t need activation: it’s enough to leave them on a street or in a market for lethal radiation to be released”.
The process of fixing potential breaches of security is long, complicated and sensitive. While it is true that certain security measures have begun to take place, these are still insufficient, nor are they free of error. In the case of machines that can scan containers, for example, the scanning process is not 100% accurate, and it takes a significant amount of time. In a port like Singapore’s, which experiences a traffic flow of roughly 19 million containers per year, the dispatching of cargo would be delayed. “Today, when merchandise transportation is based on the punctuality of its arrival at a port, and the direct delivery to the client, time is a critical factor”, states Dvir.
After the attacks of September 11th, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed security measures that constituted the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which was implemented on July 1, 2004. “The first step is to undertake a risk-assessment and an analysis of the present situation”, explains Dvir. “In some cases it could be that there is a security plan that simply doesn’t fit the specific, real needs. The second step is to initiate inspections and emergency drills, which is a bit more complicated, because no port is ready to suspend its activities for a simulation. The solution is to carry out the drills in specified areas of the port where daily activity would be least interrupted. The conclusions drawn from these confined exercises could then be applied to other parts of the port. The Americans have already begun this process.
The major obstacle to realizing a security plan is convincing the parties involved of its importance. “The most efficient way for maritime security consultants to effect change in the ports of certain countries is by reaching out to local security companies who are familiar with the local market, mentality, and of course, the language. Only these companies can be successful. Only local parties can, for example, explain to contractors constructing new ports or renovating old structures that installing security measures during the construction phase is considerably cheaper than doing so after construction has been completed…”
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