Part 1 out of 3 of the comprehensive paper Central Police Organisations’s Key Result Areas in Training For Anti-Maoist Operations: Need and Method Analysis

Introduction

DEPLOYMENT of Central Police Organisation (CPO) in Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) is not a new phenomenon. Many units of CPO have served in the northeast, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Punjab and more recently in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected states of the country. It would be unfair to negate their contribution; as is being done, or attempted to, in certain sections of the media and intelligentsia. Recent setbacks suffered by CPOs and the state police in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra and West Bengal have heated up a debate about the operational preparedness of CPOs and state police forces.

Intensity of LIC, in terms of motivation of Maoists; quality and lethality of their arsenal; standard of their training and complexities of political, media and international linkages espousing their cause have increased manifold. CPO or army is no longer facing ‘rag-tag cadres’ armed with country-made weapons and living off the land. The rebels are adequately supported by modern technology. It is a conflict situation where both sides have their distinct advantages and disadvantages. Over a period of time the Maoists have established their ‘control’ over large swathes of territory. It will take some time and toil for CPOs to loosen their grip and wrest control from the Maoists.Overnight results cannot be expected.

The LICO is a live situation. Plainly speaking, either one kills or gets killed. Unfortunately, this is the rule of engagement. CPOs have to observe the law of the land, human rights, avoid collateral damage and above all treat a Maoist rebel as an Indian and not an enemy. Maoists have no such qualms – brutality exhibited by their cadres in recent attacks on CPOs is testimony to this. In live situations operational lapses are costly in terms of casualties. All forces, irrespective of the colour of their uniform have learnt this – albeit hard way.

Much has been spoken and written about the macro issues concerning anti-Maoist operations, but the micro issues which are battle-winning factors at unit and sub-unit level have not been addressed. There could be two reasons to this apathy; firstly, grass root-level tactical problems do not fascinate those who dabble in macro policy issues; secondly, the unit and sub-unit commanders neither voice their concern in right forums nor take corrective action themselves.

Victory in war is an outcome of many successful battles and a battle is won on account of many successful minor tactical operations. So, tactical operations at company and platoon level cannot be viewed as mundane chore – unworthy of a senior commander’s indulgence. Anti-Maoist operations are company, platoon and section commander’s battle. Hence, all shortcomings at unit and sub-unit level must be addressed with the alacrity these deserve.

It seems that some CPOs, for instance the CRPF, have been raised at a pace that outstrips the aspect of individual and collective training; unit and sub-unit integration; rank and file structure, camaraderie and operational readiness. Such hastily-raised units if pressed into anti-Maoist operations are likely to encounter problems when dealing with live situations. The units can be helped by imparting additional operation-specific training in identified ‘grey areas’.

Macro Management Issues

Employment and Deployment

Concept of employment of CPOs needs a relook. The forces are allotted by Central Government on requisition from the state governments. The district collector and police chief have a say in their deployment. This arrangement is alright for policing and law and order duties. For anti-Maoist operations, the battalion and range commanders should have operational freedom and be given adequate time for preparation, planning, reconnaissance and deployment of headquarters, units and sub-units in a systematic counter-insurgency grid.

Grid deployment casts larger footprint, covers exit and entry routes; enables area domination, facilitates resource control and mass contact with the population. The population feels more secure and is more forthcoming with information and intelligence. In a grid deployment troops and sub-units are always available for each other’s cooperation and rescue.

Practice of employment of CPO in stand-alone company and platoon posts is tactically unsound. It is commonly observed that a CPO battalion has its companies deployed all over the country and yet the battalion commander is expected to exercise an effective command and control over the unit. In such situations, as the unit cohesion suffers, sub-units are left to fend for themselves – operationally and administratively. A unit commander must be afforded the opportunity to train and deploy his unit together for a better operational performance. Deployment in penny packets is detrimental. An unit must not be deployed in more than two halves. CPOs employment and deployment should be spelt in terms of battalions and not in companies, as is the practice.

Last minute requisition (or release) of CPO causes many problems – the unit or sub-unit commanders have to rely on the tactical wisdom and ground knowledge of others as they did not have a chance to reconnoiter the area. The unit may get deployed in a tactically unsuitable area. Due to administrative problems commanders are loathe to relocate and continue occupying wrong location, inviting actions from the insurgents. Such mistakes have often proved fatal.

Intelligence Network

Short notice move of units and sub-units adversely affects establishment of intelligence network and the unit has to depend on the view point (may be biased) of the district officials. As an input their view point may work but it has to be worked upon by developing new sources and spreading area of influence. For the success of a unit in anti-Maoist operations, tactical intelligence is important; strategic intelligence is just a ‘could know’ subject and matters very little.

Poor intelligence has been the most profound cause of recent reverses suffered by CPOs. Otherwise, how does one explains the inability of oblivious troops to discern the presence of hundreds of Maoist cadres in near vicinity of a camp location, assembled with an intention to carry out a raid or ambush?

Intelligence gathering is a dynamic process. Commanders cannot be rooted to their bases, if the intelligence is to be generated. They have to devise an intelligence collection plan, employ troops, sources and other agencies to collect intelligence. At the same time intelligence to Maoists has to be denied. Human-intelligence and technical-intelligence should complement each other. Flow of intelligence in real-time for units and sub-units to act up on is necessary. There is a palpable frustration among the commanders regarding the paucity of intelligence in anti-Maoist operations. They need to be patient and try all alternatives. Flow of intelligence is related to the degree of fear of Maoists in the hearts and minds of population – more the fear, lesser the intelligence.

Equipment Profile

Post-Dantewada a debate in the media was unleashed about the use of ‘third dimension’ for fighting the Maoist. Lots of views regarding use of helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, drones and aerial fire power were put forth by the informed and otherwise. No one cared to ask the troops or units on the ground about their requirement in terms of small arms, night vision devices, communication sets, body armour, mine detectors, anti-mine vehicles, electronic intelligence devices, etc.

Such cloistered opinions are put forth by those who are uninitiated and lack exposure to the experiences of armies and police of other nations engaged in similar operational tasks. Global exposure enhances the vision of senior and junior commanders, which is required so that the unit and sub-unit commanders could lead with knowledge and innovativeness.

Techniques and equipments for LICO have undergone a sea change. Technology is all pervasive and is helping police and armies in fighting insurgents at minimal casualties. It would be prudent if we learn from all available sources and then calibrate our operational responses. Such expertise is available abroad, in India and even online. One must make use of it.

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 Courtesy of Colonel (Retd.) U.S. Rathore, INDIA

 

Colonel U.S. Rathore (Retd.) is an infantry officer from Indian Army. He has served for nearly three decades and has, besides conventional operations, garnered valuable experience in counter-insurgency, counter-terror and counter-infiltration operations. He is a graduate from famed Defence Services Staff College of India and has been instructor in Army War College. Post retirement he is a threat and risk analyst and security consultant with Effect Shield - India.